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Chance has been defined as luck, superstition, risk, probability and accidental. The 
historical narrative of chance is of intelligent minds trying to grasp the uncertain and use 
it to their advantage (Everett, 2008, p. 6). Chance is a force that humans seek to 
control, in the forms of risk and gambling (p. 4). While these tactics were medieval and 
unknown, they had a great relation to sacred texts and literature where chance was 
used as a communication with a greater power (p. 5). It was used to determine justice in 
the judicial system, for entertainment, and other means to demonstrate favour with the 
gods (p. 5). These days, chance has evolved systems to combat the uncertain, for 
example using risk assessment to preserve human life and probability in mathematics 
(p. 6). 
 
John Cage’s use of chance in music gives us an insight into a world of experience and 
aesthetic. Cage, a notable avant-garde minimalist, often incorporates “natural” sounds 
or environmental sounds into his works (Piekut, 2013, p. 134).  In his book Silence 
(1939), he presents his way of using chance operations to best depict the natural 
behaviour of sounds (p. 2). Another view of chance is presented by Henri Bergson in 
Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1935). He views chance as an unexpected 
catalyst that derails any plan, no matter how well thought out (p. 121). Chance is the 
gap between what is known and what will happen - an uncertainty. This essay will 
analyse the notion of chance according to John Cage and Henri Bergson, and how 
these notions of chance complement each other. Then, consider the significance of 
human life as a flux, the past as it flows into the present and shapes the future. Finally, 
discovering the nature of art brought out by human significance and intention. 
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John Cage is a composer and a philosopher whose notable compositions and 
unconventional methods are widely acclaimed (Pritchett, 1993, p. 2). Cage studied with 
Arnold Schoenberg along with other religious teachers and literature, which informed his 
philosophy of chance and his use of silence (Jensen, 2009, p. 97). An example would 
be Cage’s piece 4’ 33”, the silent piece, where the tacet features in scheduled, 
meditative sections imploring the listener to listen to the sounds as they are. James 
Pritchett (1993), notes that Cage’s view of chance was saturated by religious literature 
around the ideas of control and randomness (p. 1). Rob Haskins (2014) examines the 
writings of a Zen mentor of Cage’s,  D. T. Suzuki, who was a primary influence on 
Cage’s understanding of Zen Buddhism (p. 617). Cage’s (1939) philosophy and his 
compositions put him in two very defined roles - philosopher and composer (p. 3). 
Jensen (2009) similarly draws on Cage’s musical and philosophical influences, 
asserting the same ideas of control and randomness (p. 97). The following are 
examples of works that communicate Cage’s use of indeterminacy through his 
philosophy of chance, namely - Music of Changes (1951) and Number Pieces.  
 
Mark Jensen (2009) breaks down Cage’s use of chance operations in his 1951 work, 
Music of Changes (p. 100). Music of Changes (1951), inspired by the I Ching or book of 
changes, bears a hint of resemblance to the workings of Arnold Schoenberg’s twelve 
tone technique (p. 99). Schoenberg’s twelve tone technique is a systemisation to have 
some control over the random nature of chance which Cage uses in his works as a 
determinate (p. 99). Cage’s book, Silence (1939) lays out his methods of composition 
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and breaks down the examples of different pieces of music to analyse where the role of 
indeterminacy is the most effective (p. 3). Cage’s indeterminacy encompasses a distinct 
divide between the categories and roles of composition and performance (Cage, 1939, 
p. 3). Jensen (2009) cites Pritchett in his article, in regards to Cage’s division of 
compositions into structure, method, form and sonic characteristics of the sound, 
showing a very structured analysis of indeterminacy used in the most effective way to 
convey the natural progression of sound (p. 97). Robert Wen (2014) describes the Book 
of Changes which reads like a book of probability with different combinations (The 
principle of yin yang and the book of changes, para. 4). This resembles Cage’s process 
in Music of Changes, having a number of probable combinations for the performer to 
put together (Jensen, 2009, p. 98). The aspect that was left indeterminate in this case 
was the form that the performer would eventually perform. This enables the listeners, as 
well as the composer, to have an unpredictable and unique experience as the piece is 
being performed. Cage’s view on chance, in this case, is to allow sounds to take their 
natural course in spite of the order of structured form. 
 
As Cage’s intent becomes more apparent in his works of chance, the degree of 
randomness seems to take on a form of reason which allows us to ponder on the idea 
of silence, or lack thereof, through his intention (Fetterman, 2010, p. 71). Both Rob 
Haskin (2014) and Clemens Gresser (2014) refer to Cage’s Number Pieces in relation 
to the indeterminate and structured silence. These pieces were a prime example of 
allowing the audience to listen, respond to the piece and showcase nature in the form of 
chance (Haskin, 2014, p. 617). The idea of structuring silence according to Gresser 
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(2014), at the beginning of the piece is in itself unconventional (p. 585). The convention 
for Cage’s works were a formal classical setting with performers and a conductor but in 
this case, the silent sections were executed without a conductor and the entrances 
seemed at random to the listener without having the score in view (p. 581). As Cage 
had described in Silence, the indeterminacy of the Number Pieces was left up to the 
performer (p. 581). Haskins (2014) suggests a comment by Cage in allowing the silent 
sections to stand out in dynamic if the active parts were played almost inaudibly (p. 
625). Haskins notes that the idea of silence is the equivalent to emptiness or 
nothingness with positive connotations (p. 617). This meditative view of the 
indeterminate in silence roots deeply in Cage’s understanding of eastern philosophy 
through the teachings of Suzuki. Cage’s view on chance in his Number Pieces reflect a 
desire to build relationships and blur lines, creating connections in music.  
 
Henri Bergson influenced many artists and thinkers with a philosophy asserting a 
relationship between everything, a seemingly eastern philosophical aesthetic. His 
response to mechanism and teleology allows us to think beyond the constraints of 
categories and laws (Bergson, 1935, p. 231). It is important to keep in mind Bergson’s 
idea of time and life, or in his words duration and vital impetus, as we examine his 
notion of chance (Murray, 2004, p. 83). Bergson’s notion of duration is an ever 
changing, constantly creating process of art and existence (Bergson, 1911, p. 6). In 
contrast to static clock time, duration is the reality of our existence consisting of 
uninterrupted change, our past flowing into the present and informing our future (p. 2). 
As our existence is being created, our attention (intellect) gives us glimpses of artificially 
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isolated events together with the thoughts and feelings (intuition) that accompany it (p. 
3). This resulting state of creating is what Bergson demonstrates as the unforeseen, the 
uncertain, the unknown and the indeterminate (Bergson, 1935, p. 116). 
 
Bergson's notion of chance  is vastly different from the contemporary view. In Two 
Sources of Morality and Religion (1935), static religion informs Bergson’s view of 
chance (p. 118). Adriana Alfaro Altamirano wrote Bergson and the Morality of 
Uncertainty, an article published 2016, on Bergson’s idea of chance in Two Sources of 
Morality and Religion (p. 44).  Altamirano analyses that Bergson’s view of chance is 
created by intelligent minds that are able to process into existence the idea of the 
unexpected (p. 44).  Intellect and intuition are subjectively the collective existence or 
absence of the other, where intelligence seeks to rationalise everything including the 
inexplicable and intuition is always certain of itself (Altamirano, 2016, p. 44). Static 
religion assures us from a multitude of uncertainties in life, one of which is the 
unavoidable sting of death (Altamirano, 2016, p. 44). If such a momentous event as the 
death of a man, were to require an explanation despite no existence and evidence of 
foul play, then to explain this death can only be by chance (Lacey, 1989, p. 154). What 
we can be sure about death is not when or where it will happen but the fact that it will, 
which makes this the ultimate act of chance (Bergson, 1935, p. 120). Bergson explains 
that religion is the way intelligence assures the civilised man against fear, particularly 
the fear of death (p. 127). He mentions in contrast to intellect that intuition does not 
consider what is uncertain or unforeseen, thus chance does not exist in the intuitive 
mind (p. 116). Whilst intelligence calls for this consideration, it creates a gap of 
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uncertainty (Altamirano, 2016, p. 44). The uncertain event is mystical and instinctive in 
nature to the primitive view (p. 45). The civilised man has brought with time, the 
importance of the intellect (Bergson, 1935, p. 121). It is intellect that births the existence 
of significance, and the need for purpose in human intention (Altamirano, 2916, p. 46). 
So if a man dies by impact of an object that fell out of the sky, it is within human intellect 
to find means to his death - be it human intention or nature’s intention without reason, 
also known as luck. Intuition, on the other hand, does not consider the unexpected as it 
requires no explanation in the view of the primitive man (Bergson, 1935, p. 150).  
 
The vital impulse is a force of nature, a cause without intent, a will to live and an instinct 
for survival (Bergson, 1925, p. 92). Altamirano (2016) notes that Bergson stresses the 
importance of the vital impulse contrary to “perception” (or thought). This duality and 
plurality calls for the wholeness of thought as well as the division of action (p. 46). For 
Bergson (1935), the consideration of life is of importance as the vital impulse is one of 
duration (p. 92). The vital impulse is a force that moves life forward, a progress we 
might say, in nature as the sheer will to live (p. 92). This progress is not just of 
mechanical action but of the innate which leads us from one moment to another 
(Altamirano, 2016, p. 46). Whilst the vital impulse is the addition of elements and our 
ability to analyse is its division, intellect and intuition have both been two perspectives of 
the same reality (Bergson, 1935, p. 94). The necessity for the two perspectives, despite 
being so extreme are inseparable in time and space (Altamirano, 2016, p. 46).  
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The vital impulse Bergson urges us to consider, resembles eastern philosophy in a 
holistic way. Bergson (1935) views life as a whole undivided experience and a 
relationship with everything (p. 93). Buddhism displays a similar sentiment in a sense of 
non-being where the understanding of existence is not as an individual but in the holistic 
“Universal Mind” (Wen, 2014, Chinese Buddhism, para. 13). Some of Buddhism’s main 
ideas are that there is no constant in the universe, that everything is momentary, and 
the denial of self (Wen, 2014, Chinese Buddhism, para. 2). Cage’s thought of the 
dissociation from the human element is likely a semblance of the denial of self, where 
everything is a part of a whole.  
 
Religion and philosophy are distinct schools of action and thought respectively, even if 
they occasionally cross into the other (Bergson, 1935, p. 173). Cage’s intention with 
chance was to demonstrate the nature of sound and allow everyone to be part of the 
composition process (Gresser, 2014, p. 593). With Buddhism, we see a need for both 
religion and philosophy to intermingle, creating a balance of both the intellect and 
intuition that Bergson (1911) describes in terms of the creative mind (p. 45). These 
philosophical intentions of Cage marrying nature and human are congruent to the 
eastern philosophy of Buddhism as well as Bergson’s approach to chance and religion.  
 
Both Bergson and Cage’s notion of chance have an inevitable influence of religion. 
When we consider the derivative source of inspiration, we must also consider what 
came before those who formed the notion of chance (Altamirano, 2016, p. 46). John 
Cage (1939) was raised in the Methodist Episcopal Church and had great interest in the 
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rituals of the Liberal Catholics as they had both eastern and western influences (p. 271). 
This reflects his amalgamation of eastern and western philosophy in his compositions 
(Jensen, 2009, p. 97). Henri-Louis Bergson was born into a Jewish family in Paris, 18 
October 1859 (Hastoupis, 1948, p. 596). He was born to Jewish parents but studied 
Catholicism (Brown et al., 1996, p. 67). This influenced Bergson’s understanding of 
religion and how doctrine (static religion) births a radical faith (dynamic religion) 
(Gontier, 2015, p. 23).  
 
Bergson’s chance rivals the definition to that of the contemporary worldview. Bergson 
implores us that despite the lack of intent behind the chance act, our intellect still finds a 
place for it (Altamirano, 2016, p. 43). It is human nature to want to find reason and 
religion is our defence against the uncontrollable, unpredictable earthly force (Bergson, 
1935, p. 116). In review, Bergson’s (1935) notion of chance is created by intelligence as 
a defence against the unknown while religion is born of belief and intuition to defend 
against the crushing truth accompanying intelligence (p. 117). Chance, by default, is 
irreconcilable with the Christian belief of God’s omniscience which quenches the fear of 
the unknown. Some denominations grasp the certainty with predestination whilst others, 
a providence. An omniscient God can foresee what will happen and grants assurance 
against the unknown. An omnipotent God has power over life and death and grants us 
the assurance that “all things work together for the good” (Romans 8:28, NASB). This 
intention for the preservation of human life is what religion protects and chance is 
merely a human concept to those who do not have a belief of preservation to hold on to.  
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Chance, according to Cage and Bergson, has most definitely been influenced by 
philosophy. Cage’s study of music with Arnold Schoenberg informed his philosophical 
approaches to composition and its processes, in what Benjamin Piekut (2013) calls a 
“modernist landscape” (p. 136). This modern ontology was likely reflected in how Cage 
analysed music and some of his aesthetic emulated that of his teacher, Schoenberg, 
who developed the twelve tone scale (Cage, 1939, p. 9). Despite the sense of modern 
ontology, his philosophy showcased postmodern themes of nature and how chance is 
used to demonstrate the process of nature in uncertainty, which, both coincidentally and 
purposefully, demonstrates Cage’s certainty of the uncertain (Piekut, 2013, p. 135). 
Jensen (2009) refers to Cage’s philosophy as the western view of eastern philosophy 
(p. 97). Haskins (2014) examines Cage’s influence of Zen Buddhism in his compositions 
to appreciate the simplicity of listening (p. 628). Piekut (2013) divulges on the 
philosophy Cage used in compositions as nature taking its course (p. 135). Through 
personal deduction, together with his religious background and his influence in the 
philosophy of Zen Buddhism, Cage’s philosophy reflects a sort of Unitarian 
Universalism which considers different philosophical ideas from different religions, thus 
the holistic view through the filter of western thought. The philosophy of the whole in 
Bergson’s duration draws parallels to Cage’s philosophy of listening to sounds, being in 
the moment and connecting people. A similar parallel can be said of these notions of 
chance - that human significance in the indeterminate calls for meaning. 
 
In Begin Again (2010), Kenneth Silverman writes about one of Cage’s most notable 
performances of indeterminacy (p. 152). In 1952, Cage was set to premier his silent 
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piece, known as 4’ 33”, at Maverick Concert Hall. As the piece began, the pianist sat at 
the piano and opened the lid which began the structured time of the tacet in three 
movements. The audience cheered and booed, some critics walked out and other 
people met old friends (p. 153). The most interesting thing about the event was Cage’s 
response to the audience about his disappointment with their quality and quantity of 
disapproval (p. 153). This human interaction in music, despite it being Cage’s or not, 
requires a human element (Piekut, 2013, p.135). Piekut (2013) notes that Cage sought 
to marry nature and human through his chance operations dealing with change and 
indeterminacy (p. 134). In contrast, Cage mentions in his book, Silence (1939), that the 
removal of the human element from music would leave us with art (p. 44).  This raises 
the question, can there be art without human significance?  
 
 
The short answer is, no. Thus far, we have established that chance is used by the 
civilised man to give reason to the unexpected in the form of human significance or 
intention (Altamirano, 2016, p. 45; Jensen, 2009, p. 97). Despite the disconnection from 
the lack of substantial intention, chance is still unavoidably full of human significance 
(Bergson, 1935, p. 121). If thought was given to the subject involved in an event that 
seemed to happen “by chance”, there would not be the absence of something, for, if 
“nothing” was to be of importance, it is in fact something (Altamirano, 2016, p.45). 
Piekut’s (2013) analysis of Cage’s work was mechanistic in nature which suggests that 
human significance is necessary for its workings (p. 135). Cage himself divided part of 
different compositions to demonstrate the function of the indeterminate and how viable it 
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is in each section (Cage, 1939, p. 3). He broke the compositions down into sections of 
structure, method, form and the composites of the sound, concluding with the 
indeterminate being most effectively communicated through the performer in terms of 
form (p. 3). Despite his desires of portraying chance in an experiential view, Cage 
himself has had to disassemble different works to analyse where in the work 
communicates chance at its most natural state (Piekut, 2013, p. 137). In Lorand’s 
(1999) view of Bergson’s dualism, Cage would have no chance of experiencing his work 
as a performer plays it back to him (p. 407). She writes that Bergson’s bias towards the 
intuitive creates a paradox, that the intuitive has a power over the intellect but it is not 
reciprocal (p. 408). It may seem Bergson has favourable intent towards the intuitive but 
he does not deny that intelligence is necessary (Bergson, 1935, p. 116). In fact, 
intellect, which is born of human significance, is what gives meaning to the vital 
(Altamirano, 2016, p. 45). Stephen Linstead and John Mullarkey (2003) analyse 
Bergson’s works to gather a multiplicitous character of life (p. 11). The dualities that 
Bergson discusses are extremes to the fact of life which bring about the complexities 
that branch off in pluralities (p. 11). The consideration of life is necessary, because life 
is not simple. 
 
Cage’s intention behind his chance operations is the idea of unity. Cage is a composer 
who has influenced his compositions with his philosophy (Pritchett, 1993, p. 2). There is 
no room for division to set apart the philosopher from the composer as they work as one 
indistinguishable entity, just as we cannot set apart the human element as it is 
integrated into the core of art itself. Cage’s attempts to marry human and nature are as 
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difficult as it is to marry the civilised and primitive man (Piekut, 2013, p. 135). The 
primitive and civilised man are both, in fact, man, and nature is not easily subverted 
(Altamirano, 2016, p. 44). His process of separating the roles of composer, performer 
and listener in his analysis makes this division clear that he is operating from an 
intellectual view (Haskins,  2014, (p. 628). Despite this analysis, his emphasis on 
structured silence allows the roles to blend together and blur the lines between those he 
had defined (Gresser, 2014, p. 593). This invites a collaboration between the roles into 
art and everyday life (Haskins, 2014, p. 626). 
 
In my practice as a musician and artist, chance is evident in many ways. Field 
recordings do not have a choice of omitting particular sounds as compared to recording 
and isolating sounds in the studio. Even then, the studio has only a limited reach to 
which we have control over. As we incorporate life, the more we invite the uncertain and 
unknown in. The chance operations used coincide with the accidental, the uncertain as 
well as the indeterminate. Cage left as much control as possible in the hands of the 
performer to display the effective nature of indeterminacy, which is just short of 
improvisational. Improvisation is a performance method to leave the composition up to 
the performer, essentially leaving it to chance. There may be a small element of 
structure in terms of time or chordal progression but the form and sense of flow is left up 
to the performer’s discretion. Much like Cage, the field recording determines the form of 
my composition but rather than a live performer with a unique performance each time, I 
captured the indeterminate in a moment of time. As the music gets heard in different 
places through different mediums in different spaces, it is still like a whole new 
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experience in every listen. Other examples of chance operations include mistakes in a 
performance, a wrong chord, stumbling on a melodic or harmonic line and changing the 
chord altogether. The conventions of a genre help us predict the way the chordal 
progression will move to direct the flow of music and some genres have less 
determinants than others.  
 
Both Cage and Bergson have emphasized the importance of experience in terms of 
duration. Cage’s perspective of music is one of constant change and is meant to be 
appreciated as a fleeting moment (Haskins, 2014, p. 618). Bergson (1910) agreeably 
describes the indivisible notion of experience and to be fully immersed in it (p. 100). 
Both Bergson and Cage’s notion of chance are agreeably meaningful. Cage’s (1939) 
lecture on Experimental Music describes the way sounds should be heard in its natural 
state through life (p. 11). Not dissimilarly, Bergson’s (1935) vital impulse calls on us to 
consider life and its constant flux of change (p. 92).  
 
Chance, regardless of the risks, can be of meaningful intent from the good and a lesson 
learnt from the bad. It is irrefutable that we require the civilised mindset of our intellect to 
produce these assurances against fear, more specifically, the fear of the unknown 
(Bergson, 1935, p. 128). It is also undeniable that we have a primitive mindset called 
intuition or vital impulse to enable us to react accordingly to life (p. 91). Despite some 
interjection of the coexistence of both intellect and intuition in its irreversible nature of 
negative interaction (Lorand, 1999, p. 407), there was never a question about the 
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intelligent mind reverting into a previous intuitive state, but rather a completely new 
perspective from an intuitive state of an analytical mind (Bergson, 1911, p. 4).  
 
Perhaps Cage’s intended dissociation of the human element from music is in reference 
to our ability to analyse. Bergson describes melody in Time and Free Will (1910), as an 
“organic whole” unseparated by thought, action, time or space (p. 101). This experience 
cannot exist with the intellect in full force but it can have a different experience listening 
to the same piece with intuition in flux, or as Bergson calls it - duration. Cage has an 
undeniable aesthetic which he cannot deny, if aesthetic was left to our human devices 
in the operation of decision making. Ultimately, Cage’s works of chance were intended 
to reflect a meditative silence in order to allow sounds to be themselves as well as 
demonstrate a human togetherness in the creation of music (Gresser, 2014, p. 593). 
Despite their differences, both thinkers result in similar conclusions of an undivided 
wholeness in the experience of music as well as life, regardless of the intellectual, 
divisive forethought that went into the composition. Without human intention, we would 
not have art as we know it. It is a living, breathing, constantly changing form as art, like 
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